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Abstract 
The growth of US combat capability due to the operational introduction of drones is the 
most significant of any weapon system in recent decades. Under this new operating model, 
the drones are proliferating a myriad of essential activities in the battle space, while 
relieving the pilot of the risk of monotonous or dangerous missions, who operates thousands 
of miles away in an air-conditioned cubicle, executing the attack on a high-definition 
monitor.  
By analyzing the current situation, from the standpoint of the conduct the United States of 
America (USA), indications reveal change in the nature of the political debate influenced by 
the widespread employment of drones. Namely, judging specifically how drones affect the 
strategic culture of states by the use of coercive force to achieve political objectives and, in 
particular, the almost irresistible political temptation to employ air power as a principal 
military response. In this context, the issue at stake is whether Remote Control Air War 
strengthens the capacity of deterrence and compulsion of future opponents, or if, on the 
other hand, lowers the bar for the use of force, making hostile conflict more likely.  
The focus of this discussion is on the argument that drones provide the ability to employ 
military capabilities in a conflict, without the need to build a broad political or public 
consensus. Likewise, while making the political decision-making process easier and 
spontaneous in order to use force, the planning and execution of military strategy is made 
more difficult, the result of the complexity and uncertainty of “boomerang” effects. 
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1. Introduction 
In November of 2001, somewhere in the desert of Afghanistan, the world witnessed the 
birth of a new and overwhelming chapter in the history of air power. Muhammad Atef 
became the first target from an unmanned American aircraft; a drone designated “The 
Predator”. From that moment a new technology and concept of operations flourished, 
producing impressive and disproportionate effects, prompting an almost irreversible 
temptation by politicians to the nascent resource of Remote Control Air War.  
The growth of US combat capability due to the operational introduction of drones is the 
most significant of any weapon system in recent decades. Namely, the ability to remain 
airborne with a predetermined objective for more than 24 hours while executing 
constant surveillance and carrying precision weaponry, over a ton, ready to be dropped 
on targets of opportunity. Under this new operating model, the drones are proliferating 
a myriad of essential activities in the battle space, while relieving the pilot of the risk of 
monotonous or dangerous missions, who operates thousands of miles away in an air-
conditioned cubicle, executing the attack on a high-definition monitor.  
To the extent this operational indispensability is increasing, a three-dimensional 
profusion of Remote Control Air War is developing. Specifically, in the diversity of 
shapes and sizes, the broadening the spectrum of missions and user base, and the 
increasing levels of autonomy on par with the prospect of weaponization. It is exactly 
the irresistibility of this surgical non-apocalyptic approach, and the reduced costs, that 
may make this propagation permanent with destabilizing effects for international 
relations. 
By analyzing the current situation, from the standpoint of the conduct the United States 
of America (USA), indications reveal change in the nature of the political debate 
influenced by the widespread employment of drones. Namely, judging specifically how 
drones affect the strategic culture of states by the use of coercive force to achieve 
political objectives and, in particular, the almost irresistible political temptation to 
employ air power as a principal military response. In this context, the issue at stake is 
whether Remote Control Air War strengthens the capacity of deterrence and 
compulsion of future opponents, or if, on the other hand, lowers the bar for the use of 
force, making hostile conflict more likely. It is also important to consider while 
removing the human cost to the offender; the employed application of armed drones 
becomes a sufficient expression of the political will to wage war. 
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 The focus of this discussion is on the argument that drones provide the ability to 
employ military capabilities in a conflict, without the need to build a broad political or 
public consensus, making the political decision-making process easier and spontaneous 
in order to use force. However, a strategic analysis of the campaign of "selective 
executions" will assist in identifying aspects of the "boomerang effect" that threatens 
the operational effectiveness of Remote Control Air War, prospectively making the 
future security environment, by its very nature complex and adverse nature, increasing 
hostile and dangerous. 
 
2. The Political Temptation For Remote Control Air War  
American politicians have always admired the military capability to find and destroy 
targets from a distance (Zenko, 2010a). However, the American policy trend toward 
limiting the military footprint whenever confronted with challenges that threaten 
national interests is taken to the extreme with recourse to drone attacks. The fact that 
these systems are a low-cost option, always available, and with high operational 
efficiency is not distinct from this trend. 
From this standpoint, the Predator is a technological evolution for the Obama 
Administration analogous to what the cruise missile was to President Clinton in the 
1990s: a form of flexing foreign policy muscle without the inherent costs of employing 
ground forces. This political objective is one of the catalysts for the preeminence of 
future use of drones and, above all, to advance development of more capable systems, 
particularly in terms of reach, persistence and autonomy.  
The relevance of the political preference for Remote Control Air War can be verified by 
noting that at the end of 2011 the USA employed drone attacks, simultaneously and 
continuously, in six different theaters, in addition to surveillance missions in at least a 
dozen countries, including the domestic level. In this context, operations in permissive 
air environments, where the threat to the drones is minimal and in some cases with 
tacit or explicit local government support, maximizes the persistent capability to collect 
intelligence and identify emergent targets.   
The employment of drones translates into a smaller military “footprint" that may be 
politically attractive. The concept of remote operations and the characteristics 
associated with these systems to perform long-range attacks allow a reduction in the 
need for forward operating locations for power projection. Without the need for this 
strategic requirement international interference, the obligation to gather consensus, 
and build coalitions that support the use of force is reduced. Likewise, consulting 
Congress to obtain political legitimacy to carry out actions of Remote Control Air War is 
bypassed. 
In addition, this technology is extremely enticing, both politically and militarily, in so far 
as it conveys a false impression that a war is no longer costly. The decision to wage 
war always had serious consequences. However, it is now possible to start a conflict 
without having to deal with some of the more severe implications, like sending ground 
troops. One of the factors of war deterrence assumes high costs translated into "blood 
and treasure”. To reduce the shedding of "blood", war is made less harsh, less 
demanding and more socially acceptable, limiting the onus just to "treasure". Thus, 
Remote Control Air War fits into a long Western tradition of finding relatively safe 
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methods to employ lethal force, such as artillery and aerial bombing, leading to the 
belief that avoiding military casualties is more valued than casualties among the 
opposing civilian population (Olsthoorn et al., 2011). 
On par with the reduction of the individual requirement of the combatants, warfare at a 
distance requires less societal acceptance, making it a primary policy option. The use of 
cruise missiles on Somalia and Sudan during the Clinton presidency proves this 
observation. Also, American terrestrial intervention in Kosovo only occurred when the 
"guarantees of impunity" were pooled. (Ignatieff, 2000: 179)  Thus, to remove the 
danger of loss of life, the employment of drones maximizes this concept of operation 
with impunity.  
The perception of a war without costs, as pointed out by Andrew Callam (2010), may 
be due, firstly, to the fact that it is a conflict fought covertly, away from the view of 
society. In spite of the information age, it is difficult to gain access to remote areas or 
obtain images about the attacks, which helps to insulate the public from the damage, 
preventing a transparent and impartial assessment of such conduct, in particular the 
target typology and damage caused to the civil population. Secondly, the elimination of 
human risk for the USA makes war more acceptable, decreasing the general objections 
to its occurrence and prolongation.  
On the other hand, the political-military interaction that precedes the war may also be 
affected. Up to this point, this collaboration sought to establish the most appropriate 
strategy for political objectives in such a way as to minimize the cost in "blood and 
treasure.” While the military is looking for the human resources needed to achieve the 
established goals, politicians try to minimize the impact associated with massive 
armies. However, removing the human variable from the equation transforms the 
political-military calculation, a judgment each time more rational and less subjective. 
This change in the nature of political debate, the calculation of human risk to the 
economic cost of the intervention, may relegate the need for military consultation prior 
to the decision of the use of force to the background.  
By virtue of providing a real-time common operating picture to decision-makers, it is 
possible that the decisions are ethically more consensual (Cummings, 2010). The 
greater granularity of information will mean greater accuracy, thus increasing 
understanding of the operational environment. This faculty, resulting from the 
application of automated analytical tools, allows a faster evaluation of operational risk 
and mission strategy, particularly in the process of target selection, facilitating the 
political decision for the use of force. The proclivity for Remote Control Air War can, 
however, affect the consistency of air policy. The Kosovo conflict reflects this typical 
moral conditioning imposed on air strategy, extreme discrimination and proportionality, 
to justify a fight with reduced risk. However, conducting attacks above 15,000 feet, 
outside the envelope of antiaircraft threats, reveals a greater concern for the safety of 
the pilots than for the judgment of the bombardment. 
On the other hand, the ability to "humanize" the error will decrease even as the 
collateral damage will continue to exist. Conceptually, it is easier to accept collateral 
damage caused by a manned aircraft, whose pilot makes decisions in a fraction of a 
second while subject to the rigors and threats of fighting, than admit errors caused by 
the use of drones. The extreme concern to limit the collateral damage leads to the 
establishment of complex protocols for selection and executing attacks on targets. 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 5, n.º 2 (november 2014-april 2015), pp. 59-73  
War as a continuation of politics by other means... unmanned 
João Paulo Vicente 
 63 
 
However, the inherent precision of drones associated with a typology of ever smaller 
and more diffuse targets, causes greater risk taking, especially for attacks in urban 
areas, contributing to a higher probability of unwanted effects. Thus, the reality 
presented in question will contribute to increasingly isolating society from military 
actions by reducing the supervision of political action. This erosion of verification and 
accountability of political action, essential pillars of waging war in a democratic society, 
can foster willingness for lethal force.  
An indication of the slow-down of political control on the consent and authority for the 
use of force was demonstrated in the conflict of Libya in 2011, when Obama argued 
that authorization was not required from Congress to employ U.S. forces in conflict. 
One of the instruments available to ensure a greater political consideration in the use of 
force between the President and the US Congress is the "War Powers Resolution" of 
1973, which requires the Administration to consult the Congress prior to employment of 
American armed forces in hostilities. There are, however, situations in which the 
President may employ military force without the prior approval of the Congress. For 
example, when the country has been or is in the process of being attacked, when an 
treaty obliges the defense of an ally, in cases of extraction of citizens at risk, in isolated 
punitive attacks, or in operations where the surprise prevents a wider public debate 
(Lugar, 2011: 5).  
During the initial phase of the operation in Libya (Operation Odyssey Dawn), the 
actions of American forces were significantly more intensive, sustained and dangerous 
than in the later phase, Operation Unified Protector, commanded by NATO, in which the 
United States played a supporting role. During this stage, according to the perspective 
of the Obama Administration, American participation was limited by three factors: 
military means employed, the nature of the mission, and the risk of escalation. In 
statements to Congress, Harold Koh (2011) defended the Administration's position on 
why the operation in Libya did not qualify as "hostilities" under the "War Powers 
Resolution.” Firstly, it was a mission with limited objectives. Secondly, because the 
exposure of U.S. forces was limited, risk for casualties was minimized. Thirdly, the risk 
of escalation was reduced since land forces would not be used. Finally, the employment 
of military resources was limited to the suppression of enemy air defenses to ensure 
the flight exclusion zone and the Predator attacks on targets in support of the mission 
of protecting civilians.  
From this perspective, the use of drones supported two of these positions; the limited 
exposure of the forces and the minimized risk of conflict escalation. However, the scope 
to employ force is substantially and dangerously extended by facilitating the frequency 
of Remote Control Air War. The recently introduced resolution about the "introduction 
of American forces in hostilities" can be reductive in the case of the use of drones, to 
the extent that it eliminates the concern of human losses. Although forces are exempt 
from physical risk, the number and nature of drone attacks can contribute significantly 
to increasing the stakes of hostilities.  
The political calculation about definition of hostilities has focused mainly on the 
probability of occurrence of low levels of American forces, minimizing other relevant 
considerations for use of force (Lugar, 2011: 6). From this prospect, the conflict of 
Libya does not constitute any of the exceptions mentioned, being that American aircraft 
participated in the attacks and the American support to NATO forces was crucial, 
specifically at the level of logistics, command and control, and support for deficient 
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operational areas such as information, surveillance, airborne refueling, or space 
capabilities.  
As instruments of coercive diplomacy, in the context of deterrence and compulsion, the 
employment of unmanned drones to fight in order to reduce the potential costs of the 
threat and use of force, can have major implications (Nolin, 2012: 13). Chiefly, in 
situations of added significant asymmetry between the actors in dispute and whereas 
the personnel costs are virtually zero, the credibility of such threats will be 
strengthened, since the use of force will occur with greater ease, and without the time-
consuming political and public scrutiny associated with the use of force by traditional 
means. Similarly, it is expected that possessors of combat drones will become more 
daring and increasingly use Remote Control Air War, in a preventive manner and as the 
primary instrument of conflict resolution. To simultaneously fight in six different 
locations on the planet, without any direct risk to its forces, the US seems to validate 
the hypothesis that aerial warfare has become more productive with the emergence of 
drones, confirming a greater inclination to employ this military instrument to achieve 
limited national objectives. 
In this sense, the drones provide politicians an increase of control that extends to three 
levels (Dawkins, 2005: 21-24): the control of opportunity and pace of operations to the 
extent that minimize external interference, the control over the political debate 
regarding the use of force, and the perception of precise control from the strategic level 
to the tactical employment of forces, greatly diminishing the considerable interference 
in all details of the conduct of war. Therefore, the exclusive use of this form of air 
power becomes a political solution, increasingly prominent, less demanding, easily 
justified, and acceptable. By limiting casualties and eliminating the possibility of 
prisoners of war, the drones allow the missions to be planned and executed in remote 
areas in a more subtle way. The possibility of performing an operation to attack without 
the prior media exploitation also maximizes the operational surprise.  
To assess in greater detail the temptation for the employment policy of Remote Control 
Air War, the particular case study of the American counterterrorist campaign will be 
examined. 
 
3. A new concept of operations: "The only game in town"  
On November 3, 2002, in the wilderness of Yemen, a Predator controlled by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) followed a car with six passengers. One of the occupants, 
Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, deemed responsible for the attack on the USS Cole, was 
on the President´s Al-Qaeda most sought after hit list. In an uninhabited area, a 
Hellfire missile was fired on the vehicle killing the six occupants; the first action of 
"targeted killing" (“selective execution") in history by the use of drones. In August 
2009, a leading Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, was resting on the terrace of a 
dwelling, together with his wife. Without advance notice, a missile launched from a 
Predator destroyed the house killing the terrorist, wife, and bodyguard. The execution 
in September 30, 2011 of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, one of the most influential 
operational members of Al-Qaeda, has raised the bar of this modality, since it was the 
first intentional killing of an American citizen.  
These three examples, from more than four hundred attacks carried out by the USA 
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since 2002 outside of theaters of operation such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, 
mainly by CIA-operated drones, mirror the geographical spread, the frequency of 
attacks, and demonstrate the emerging status of the prime modality of "selective 
executions" in the use of Remote Control Air War. Since June 2004, the Bush 
Administration authorized 45 attacks in northwest Pakistan. During the first term of the 
Obama Administration this number increased fivefold, in attempt to preserve political 
capital from the risk and cost associated with alternative military strategies based on 
massive employment of land forces.  
The need for the US to be "agile and accurate" in the use of military power is achieved 
with the use of drones and by Special Forces (Obama, 2009). From the viewpoint of the 
Administration, the selective attacks are strategically sensible. Specifically, the drones 
provide an unbeatable ubiquity and persistence, together with precision weapons; 
afford leverage and a window of opportunity to act. Compared with other military 
options, the elimination of risk to American forces makes these capabilities especially 
desirable. Additionally, drones reduce the danger to civilians in comparison with 
traditional bombing alternatives, since an improved visualization of the target allows 
better decisions, with pinpoint accuracy.  
It could be argued that this offensive counterterrorism strategy has delivered 
immediate results in the elimination of terrorists. The continuous pressure on terrorist 
havens, unpunished until recently, makes an action, movement, and contacts with 
allies difficult, forcing the terrorists to devote more resources to survival. Also, the 
psychological effect on the terrorist caused by the uncertainty of the next attack and 
survival, constrains operations. Empirically, the operational results arising from the 
employment of unmanned drones indicate that obtaining the same results by 
alternative means would require a large scale military force with associated political, 
economic, and social drawbacks. In this way, the strategic consequences that derive 
from the use of force are smaller than those resulting from the projection of armies, 
which are usually perceived as foreign occupation. In addition, wars of occupation tend 
to be expensive and to ignite the resentment against the United States. 
Similarly, it is argued that drones reduce the escalation of the conflict, making the 
platform an essential tool in counterterrorism strategy (Anderson, 2010). The logic is 
simple: decimating the principal leadership with the most experience in the network 
degrades the command and control ability of Al-Qaeda. The zenith of this program 
occurred with the death of Osama Bin Laden, with recourse to an action of "selective 
enforcement", in which Special Forces were used to ensure positive identification of the 
target and its extraction.  
The attrition of Al-Qaeda leadership hinders the reconstitution of the organization and 
reduces operational efficiency. For example, of the 30 primary members of Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, drones have killed 20 since 2010 (Nolin, 2011: 19). Contrary 
to popular belief, the number of trained terrorists is quite limited (Byman, 2006). When 
an experienced terrorist is eliminated there is a direct impact on operations as it takes 
several months to train a replacement with sufficient experience to be effective. 
Regardless, the organization continues to recruit terrorists but they lack the requisite 
experience and leadership to constitute a significant threat.  
Other academics, citing testimonies of Al-Qaeda operatives, go further by proposing the 
hypothesis that there would be a greater threat to the world of nuclear terrorism 
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without the use of this modality (Zenko, 2010b). From this standpoint, the drone 
attacks are an essential tool for killing terrorists who provide operational support to 
international terrorism, this option considered morally justified to prevent future 
terrorist attacks. Everyone seems to agree that killing the insurgents does not 
automatically lead to victory, but as Steven Metz (2000: 55) emphasizes, "a resolution 
of the root causes is easier with the insurgent leaders outside of the scene." 
 
4.  The "boomerang" effects from the "selective executions" campaign  
These optimistic propositions view the use of drones as the most effective and 
necessary way to use military force against insurgents. However, the official American 
support for the conduct of this operation mode is somewhat paradoxical. Firstly, an 
expansive interpretation of the legal framework is transmitted while simultaneously 
maintaining limited criteria. Secondly, a modality of action is legally justified while 
taking place covertly. Finally, factual details about the decision-making process and the 
conduct of the intelligence services are limited to the public while an image of 
transparency is advocated.  
Bergen et al. (2011) have questioned whether the drone campaign, although useful in 
the short term, may undermine American efforts to stabilize the region, creating a 
long-term gain for Al-Qaeda. Peter Singer (2009: 312) asks whether or not this mode 
of warfare contributes to an increase of revolt and membership in the terrorist cause, 
while Jane Mayer (2009) argues that the global employment of drone attacks will make 
retaliation inevitable.  
The public debate on the effectiveness of the employment of unmanned drones in lethal 
attacks on terrorists has not yet been proved an unequivocal strategic success. In the 
same way, it is not clear what the achieved outcomes, with the attrition imposed on 
terrorist leadership beyond the impact that civilian casualties, have on the recruitment 
of new terrorists, as well as the escalation of attacks that destabilize Pakistan. In the 
case of lethal offensive actions, circumscribed to limited areas, with access to real-time 
images of the results of the attacks, the direct effects are measurable. However, these 
attacks have costs psychological and physical, direct and indirect, and cumulative and 
interrelated. These consequences will be felt at multiple levels (tactical, operational and 
strategic) and in multiple dimensions (political, economic, civil and military). Because 
military interventions should not be considered an ephemeral moment, it will be very 
difficult to foresee a conflict in which there is no need for contact on the ground 
between the parties in opposition. For this reason, the unique aspect of Remote Control 
Air War in irregular conflict intensifies difficulties regarding the stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts, to the extent that it does not allow the establishment of trust 
through direct contact with the populations. 
The lack of a comprehensive strategy to deal with a conflict makes limited use of 
military force more attractive, at the expense of lengthy and other seemingly 
ineffective instruments of national power. The use of the military instrument, quickly 
launched with high readiness, deflects the need to develop other instruments of power 
and provide them with sufficient resources to implement a long-term plan to address 
the fundamental causes of the conflict. As pointed out by Robert Gates (2007), one of 
the most important lessons of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is that successful 
military action is not enough to win. The perception is that the military instrument is 
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suitable to defeat states, particularly for regime change, but inadequate to combat 
ideas.   
For some analysts, the primary recourse for drones is an inconstant way of dealing with 
the problem of terrorism (Thiessen, 2010). The problem lies in the fact that the drone 
attacks are used as a substitute for other operations to capture terrorists alive. The 
information obtained by interrogation of more than a hundred terrorists captured after 
the September 11, prevented, according to CIA sources, numerous terrorist attacks. 
Still, the nature of the target´s remote location makes capture difficult without risking 
heavy American or host nation casualties, and this must be considered. 
On the other hand, attacking the tribal areas in Pakistan strengthens the same forces 
that the United States is trying to defeat, by alienating "hearts and minds" in an 
unstable Muslim state with nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the insurgents exploit the 
resentment of the population reaffirming themselves as a resistance force against the 
injustice of a Remote Control Air War campaign, which, at the same time, increases the 
power of attraction for new recruits. It is this balance between the neutralization of 
insurgent groups and the cost of encouraging more insurgents, which must be found. 
Concurrently, reports grow about the increase of anti-American opposition between the 
Afghan population and Pakistani and European immigrants in the West, as well as 
between the members of elite Pakistan security services (Gerges, 2010). Political 
objectives are harmed because of the negative image that emerges in the stricken 
areas, and that image expands globally. This trend can be worrisome since for some 
countries, especially those affected, as the American image is irretrievably linked to 
Remote Control Air War. The fact that the Predator has become for many Muslims the 
epitome of the arrogance of American power may, in the long term, obfuscate the 
operational effectiveness of this combat mode. 
The indicators presented as a whole seem to support a phenomenon of a loss of moral 
authority of those conducting Remote Control Air War, particularly in a campaign to win 
the “hearts and minds" of the local population. This perception than may be much 
greater than actual civilian casualties. In this way, without the need for direct contact 
with the people, the air attacks can only surgically remove insurgents. Thus, a state 
that seeks to impose its will on the opponent, without risking the lives of soldiers, will 
lose the strategic value of gained moral superiority (moral high ground). This argument 
leads William Arkin (2008) to agree with the possibility of drones posing a long-term 
risk: the perception of air power and the user as inhuman. 
The strategic consequences arising from direct combat between human 
beings and Remote Control Air War are disparate. The employment of manned 
aircraft exposes human resources to the rigors of combat and transmits a 
perception of greater political determination and willingness to accept the risk of 
casualties. Despite the impunity with which manned aircraft conduct 
attacks, resulting from air superiority, the operational risk to personnel in 
Afghanistan and Iraq is still substantial. The number of shot down aircraft, 
the possibility of capture, and the insecurity experienced on air bases, 
which were the target of several deadly attacks, confirm this threat. This 
risky interaction between combatants contributes to the enemy focusing efforts in 
the area of direct conflict (McGrath, 2010: 15). However, the extensive use of 
Remote Control Air War, seen in absolutist perspective, seems to indicate that while 
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one side sees the war as a tool, a means to an end, the other regards it from a 
metaphysical perspective, represented in the exaltation of the act of dying for a 
cause. For this reason, the perception of a lack of political determination to risk the 
lives of its citizens in combat can also contribute to strengthening the opponent´s 
resistance, developing a media information campaign to attract new members to 
the cause.  
Other critics synthesize this imbalance between the costs and benefits of the attacks 
(Kilcullen et al., 2009). Firstly, the drones create a siege mentality among civilians. 
Second, the outrage is not only located in tribal areas and but extends throughout 
Pakistan and in the international community. Finally, using technology to replace a 
strategy, without a concerted information campaign addressed to Pakistani public is 
problematic. Thus, the decision to escalate the attacks may generate a greater number 
of terrorist actions in the face of dissatisfaction giving reason to the argument to those 
who advocate a possible "boomerang effect" in which attacks can create more terrorists 
than those who are killed. 
In this sense, the attacks cause an increase in the number and the radicalism of 
Pakistanis supporting extremism, decreasing the strategic objective of making Pakistan 
a more cooperative and capable regional ally. Thus, the collateral damage and the 
perception of the constant violation of sovereignty also contributes to an increase in 
feelings of anger that unites the population around extremists and causes the spread of 
attacks in other areas of the country and the globe. (Kilcullen, 2009)  
In this framework, it is difficult to find unanimity about the effectiveness of this mode 
of warfare. Recent studies show that the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan have 
decreased to the extent that there is an escalation in the program of "selective 
executions" (Qazi et al., 2012), looking for a way to defend a negative correlation 
between the attacks of drones and the increase of militant violence (Johnston et al., 
2013). Although there is difficulty gathering consensus about the cause for anti-
American attitudes, it can be seen that these explanations are based on the assumption 
that individuals form their opinion about the USA primarily as a reaction to what the 
USA is and does (Blaydes et al., 2010). However, these authors advocate that the 
level of anti-Americanism among Muslim populations is not an organic result 
in response to acts of the USA. Rather, the level is mainly dependent on the 
intensity of anti-American messages disseminated by prominent elites of a 
given country. Namely, the anti-American rhetoric works as a political 
instrument to obtain the support of sections of the population, made more 
pronounced where there is political competition between secular and Islamic 
factions.  
The "selective executions" campaign is politically attractive because the reduced costs 
favor domestic support while at the same time demonstrating political will. However, 
the unwanted effects only appear in the long-term. In addition to the indispensable 
military value, the truth is that Remote Control Air War is a provocative symbol of 
American power, without constraints to respecting the sovereignty of states and 
eliminating the collateral damage. This conduct may offer to other actors in the 
international system incentive to imitate such behavior. However, what is at stake is 
not the weapon system, but the actual operational employment of that system. To the 
extent that the employment of Remote Control Air War is presented as a product of 
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American “exceptionalism” stating it as wise, legal, ethically correct, and with surgical 
precision, doubts arise about the impact of this conduct on other international actors. 
In other words, being that the United States is an example of world leadership, can it 
pledge that the submitted legal, moral, and political justifications will be equally 
applicable to other countries, when they resort to Remote Control Air War to confront 
threats to their safety? Additionally, to what extent will the US be morally able to 
condemn such conduct?   
A recently published study by the Stimson Center (2014) summarizes these concerns 
and recommends several steps to ensure greater transparency and accountability on 
the conduct of "selective executions". Among them is the need to perform a cost-
benefit analysis about the function of lethal drone attacks in selective counter-terrorist 
actions; the importance of explaining the legal basis for the conduct of the attacks, as 
well as the approximate number, location and affiliation of the targets of the attacks; 
the identities of civilians killed and the number of attacks carried out by military forces 
and the CIA. In addition, the United States must make a commitment to the 
development of international standards for the use of lethal force outside the theaters 
of traditional operations. In this way, it will be possible to establish precedents that 
may be accepted by the international community, to regulate the future employment of 
Remote Control Air War. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Considering war as the continuation of political relations, the preeminence of Remote 
Control Air War can contribute to altering strategic culture if states use this type of 
coercive power to advance political goals.  
In reality, the political irresistibility, resulting from the associated cost reduction for the 
use of force, is expressed by the increasing intensity on the level of discrimination for 
individual targets. It is, similarly, conveyed by the increased frequency of attacks and 
the greater geographical range for selective employment of deadly force. Nevertheless, 
this tempting policy causes “boomerang” effects, signifying that to democratize and 
civilize means more war. These effects threaten to transform the way states, non-state 
organizations, and the individual face the conflict by constantly changing the threshold, 
frequency, actors, and effects of the conflict. This makes the future security 
environment, by its very nature complex and adverse, increasingly hostile and 
dangerous. 
While war was once reserved for the achievement of vital state interests, Remotely 
Control Air War promotes enlargement of state interests by favoring the military 
response option to achieve peripheral interests while decreasing the political 
constraints, both military and civilian. In this way, and regarding the costs of political 
action, it is assessed that this method streamlines the political decision-making 
process, or bypasses it, since it is possible to employ military capabilities in a conflict 
without the need to build a broad political consensus and endure public scrutiny.  
These remotely operated systems offer strategic alternatives and flexibility to employ 
assets without the burden of positioning forces in hostile territory, therefore, increasing 
the freedom of political maneuver. Decreasing the need of forward operating bases to 
support military detachments reduces the strategic requirement of building regional 
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partnerships. Thus, the strategic and moral incentives to make this modality 
increasingly precise and remotely operated are increasing as large-scale wars decrease 
in number and intensity. Furthermore, the cost reduction of political action that can 
provide preventive military action, in areas of strategic interest, puts into perspective 
an increase of regional conflict and with it greater civil damage. 
Due to operational and political benefits, the drones will constitute an essential capacity 
to increase the situational awareness in the battle space, while, simultaneously, provide 
for the application of lethal force in a discreet way. This capability may create change in 
regional power dynamics providing small and medium-sized powers an affordable 
capability, associated with the projection of power, putting an adversary´s Center of 
Gravity at risk without traditionally prohibitive costs. Thus, an upturn in an offensive 
posture is expected, although to some extent preventive, by virtue of the reduced 
employment cost of these capabilities. Instead of deterring potential aggressors, it 
seems more likely, the prospect of an arms race in search of leveling the asymmetry, 
increasing the proliferation of drones with potentially more damaging forms of 
employment. In this case, the adverse effects of persistent surveillance and precision 
create a presumption of infallibility that can motivate risky political decision making, 
like attacks in urban areas.  
With regard to the strategic effectiveness of the Remote Control Air War on non-state 
actors, it is dependent, like other military instruments, on the amplitude of the actor’s 
objectives. The American escapade in Iraq and Afghanistan discouraged any interest to 
invade or occupy tribal regions in Pakistan or countries like Somalia, Yemen, or Libya. 
However, the need to replace the conventional option for a political and publicly 
acceptable solution, catapulted the use of drones to an urgent operational requirement. 
 In this looming strategic synthesis, the modality of "selective executions" induces a 
panoply of "boomerang" effects, which translates to a higher possibility of terrorist 
retaliation. Specifically, these effects are expressed in the recruitment of new 
insurgents, a greater complexity of the political relationship in regards to American 
strategy in the geographical areas of the attacks, and the greater regional 
destabilization in countries such as Pakistan or Yemen. Regardless of the ability to 
establish a direct causal relationship, an erosion of American credibility in the region is 
anticipated, which will gradually spread throughout the world.  
The spread of this capability to new theaters and the range of tactical-level targets can 
accelerate the local, national, and international opposition, contributing to the 
destabilization of domestic governments in whose territory attacks occur. Therefore, 
the willingness and ability of these governments to take effective action may be 
reduced against the insurgents. On this view, the focus of the campaign on the targets 
of strategic interest, rather than the widespread removal of operational targets, will 
offer lower unwanted effects. Similarly, the transfer of the program by the CIA to the 
armed forces can provide the much-needed transparency and accountability to this one 
embodiment still shrouded in secrecy. 
Additionally, the weaponization of drones, as a consequence of technological 
proliferation, may be readily available to smaller powers in the medium term. Given the 
number of countries, and organizations that have drones with range and payload 
capacity to carry substantial conventional or mass destruction weapons, it is possible to 
anticipate the spread of this threat at a global level. A natural extension of the user 
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base for terrorist groups, criminal organizations and even to individuals, can spread the 
danger of threats facing the United States.  
Unlike nuclear weapons, which by its consequences discourage use, the cost of utilizing 
Remote Control Air War is relatively low, encouraging developed nations to coerce and 
impose their will on other nations with increasingly limited risk. The circumlocution of 
interventions in remote areas of the globe, confirm a foreshadowing, in embryonic 
form, of future air strategy, forcing a reconsideration of the relationship between war 
and peace in democratic societies. Therefore, the unusual combination of 
characteristics such as the distance between combatants, combat asymmetry, 
autonomy in the use of force, and minimization of political and personnel risk, affirm 
the modality of Remote Control Air War as politically enticing. That said, Remote 
Control Air War is not an end in itself, but primarily, a fundamental tool to achieve 
certain political ends. Moreover, this mode is not a magical solution to the political goal 
of determining the objectives for the use of military power. 
As the aircraft was one of technological solutions that made it possible to balance the 
asymmetry created by the increase in firepower and entrenchment characteristic of the 
First World War, the drones have emerged as a possible solution to the contemporary 
tactical problems generated by location, identity and reduced signature of targets in 
remote global locations. Hence, to expect that these systems become the strategic 
solution for current and future wars, will certainly be a misjudgment. Moreover, 
profound consequences will accrue to accentuate the erosion of the sovereignty of 
states and the consequent increase of instability in international relations. 
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